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CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND
JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT*
Vincent M. Barnett, Jr.t

T

HE newly reconstituted Supreme Court of the United States has
become the center of an earnest controversy with respect to the
true role of the Court in constitutional interpretation. The general
controversy is, of course, far from new. What makes it of more than
ordinary significance is that the Court itself is revealing a tendency
substantially to alter the extent, if not the nature, of judicial review.
This tendency has not yet become clearly dominant, but it is apparent
enough to shake the implicit faith in the Court of many of those to
whom, before 1937, any criticism of the tribunal was something akin
to heresy.
In a speech to the annual convention of the American Bar Association in 1939, the president of that body, Mr. Frank J. Hogan, asserted
that the Supreme Court of the United States is failing the people of this
country. 1 The burden of his grievance seemed to be the decisions rendered since the spring of 1937, which have in effect reversed earlier
restrictive doctrines and have resulted in a greater breadth of activity
for legislatures, both state and federal. He deplored the expansion of
the power of the general government and pointed out that "the plain
result of all this is that no lawyer can safely advise his client what the
law is." The guards against the abuse of legislative power are being
let down, he said, and the limitations imposed upon it are being oblit-

* Objections have been made to the use of the word "self-restraint" in connection
with judicial activity. But its applicability is coming to be recognized. "As a mere matter
of history or social psychology," Professor Beard has written, "it would seem then that
a judicial interpretation of the Constitution may be and often is an expression of an
economic or social theory or predilection entertained by the individual justice and his
temporarily concurring colleagues. If so, the most effective way to avoid reading personal predilections into the Constitution is to exercise self-restraint and to assume that
a statute is constitutional unless it does evidently conflict with some clear, explicit
mandate of the Constitution." Beard, "The Act of Constitutional Interpretation," I
NAT. LAWY. Gu1LD Q. 9 at 16 (1937).
Instructor in Political Science, Williams College. A.B., M.A., University of
California at Los Angeles; Ph.D., Harvard. Formerly Ozias Goodwin Memorial Fellow
in Constitutional Law, Harvard. Author of articles in political science and legal
periodicals.-Ed.
1 Hogan, "Important Shifts in Constitutional Doctrines," 25 A. B. A. J. 629
(1939), 64 REP. A. B. A. 478 (1939).
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erated. "What was a constitutional principle yesterday may be a
discarded doctrine tomorrow, and this, all this, is what has been so
often proudly proclaimed to be a government of laws and not of men." 2
The reference to a "government of laws," and the implication that
it is being destroyed by Supreme Court decisions giving greater latitude
to legislatures in the solution of pressing social and economic problems,
is representative of one of the warring points of view concerning the
activity of the Court in interpreting the- Constitution. The other view
holds that the tribunal in the past has gone beyond its rightful sphere in
the review of legislation and has been engaged in reading its own social
and economic predilections into the Constitution. To those who hold
this latter opinion, the new majority of the Supreme Court is doing no
more than to redress a balance which until recently had been too heavily
weighted in the other direction. Mr. Hogan's discomfiture and despair,
as a lawyer, at the activity of the Court are perhaps understandable.
But to equate the modification of old constitutional doctrines with the
obliteration of a "government of laws" is to reveal a certain confusion
with regard to the nature of the process of "interpreting written constitutions. Mr. Hogan is not alone in his bewilderment. Views of
Supreme Court justices themselves demonstrate a striking divergence
in attitude on this very question.
During the course of recent years, and particularly in relation to
the constitutional decisions in 1936 and 1937 constituting what has
been termed "the Supreme Court Revolution," the opinions of the
judges on the supreme bench evince wide differences as regards the
conception of the nature and scope of judicial interpretation of the
Constitution. Justice Stone, dissenting in the A. A. A. case,S emphasized that courts are concerned with the power to enact statutes, not
with the wisdom of those statutes, and went on to point out that "while
unconstitutional exercise of power by the executive and legislative
branches of the government is subject to judicial restraint, the only
check upon our own exercise of power is our own sense of selfrestraint." 4 He noted that for removal of unwise laws from the statute
books appeal should lie not to the courts, but to the ballot and the
processes of democratic government. By implication he accused the
majority of a lack of self-restraint in voiding the statute as unwise
rather than restricting themselves to the exercise of what he conceived
to be proper judicial functions. The suggestion that the spending power
Id., 25 A. B. A. J. at 637, 64 REP, A. B. A. at 498.
United States v. Butler, 297 U. S. 1, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
4
Id., 297 U. S. at 78-79.
2

3
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must be "curtailed by judicial fiat" because it may be abused, he held,
"hardly rises to the dignity of argument. So may judicial power be
abused." 5 He concluded his remarks by asserting that "Courts are not
the only agency of government that must be assumed to have the
capacity to govern," and by pointing out the dangers in the "assumption
that the responsibility for the preservation of our institutions is the
exclusive concern of any one of the three branches of government." 6
A year later, dissenting for himself and his three conservative
brethren in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish,1 Justice Sutherland
undertook to answer his fellow justice and to point out the errors in
such an attitude. In language which leaves little doubt that he is responding directly to Justice Stone's remarks, Sutherland said,
"The suggestion that the only check upon the exercise of the
judicial power, when properly invoked, to declare a constitutional
right superior to an unconstitutional statute is the judge,.s own
faculty of self-restraint, is both ill considered and mischievous.
Self-restraint belongs in the domain of will and not of judgment." 8
He then brought forth the familiar contention that "the meaning of
the Constitution does not change with the ebb and :flow of economic
events."~ Speaking directly in relation to the majority opinion in the
instant case, which expressly reversed an interpretation accepted since
r923 and followed as precedent one scant year earlier, he said meaningfully, "The judicial function is that of interpretation; it does not
include the power of amendment under the guise of interpretation." 10
These two opinions are characteristic of the divergent views, to be
found oft-repeated in recent years, as to the nature of the function of
constitutional construction. The reality of this difference may be emphasized by noting a few other examples taken more or less at random
5
Id., 297 U. S. at 87, quoting Holmes that "it must be remembered that legislatures are the ultimate guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as
great a degree as the courts." Missouri, Kansas & Texas Ry. v. May, 194 U. S. 267
at 270, 24 S. Ct. 638 (1904).
6
United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 at 87-88, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
7
300 U.S. 379, 57 S. Ct. 578 (1937).
8
Id., 300 U. S. at 402.
9
Ibid.
10
Id., 300 U. S. at 404. In support he quoted Cooley's well-known statement that
''What a court is to do, therefore, is to declare the law as written, leaving it to the
people themselves to make such changes as new circumstances may require. The meaning
of the constitution is fixed when it is adopted, and it is not different at any subsequent
time when a court has occasion to pass upon it." I CooLEY, CoNSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS, 8th ed., 124 (1927).
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from the opinions in 1936 and 1937. Dissenting in Morehead v. New
York ex rel. Tipaldo,11 Justice Stone implied that the majority was
allowing its economic prejudices to influence its reading of the Constitution. "It is difficult to imagine any grounds," he said, "other than
our own personal economic predilections, for saying that the contract of
employment is any the less an appropriate subject of legislation than
are scores of others...•" 12 Continuing, he added that "The Fourteenth Amendment has no more embedded in the Constitution our
preference for some particular set of economic beliefs than it has
adopted, in the name of liberty, the system of theology which we may
happen to approve." 13
Chief Justice Hughes, in the majority opinion in National Labor
Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation,14 declined to
shut his eyes to "the plainest facts of our national life" and to deal
with the legislation under consideration in an "intellectual vacuum," 1 G
which is in general what the Court had been accused of doing the preceding year. This departure from "well-established principles" was
attacked in a minority opinion by Justice McR.eynolds, with whom concurred Justices VanDevanter, Sutherland and Butler. One is inclined to
agree with his assertion that "Every consideration brought forward to
uphold the Act before us was applicable to support the Acts held unconstitutional in causes decided within two years." 16 Since the personnel of the Court had not at that time been changed, this suggests the
importance of the attitude with which the justices--even the same
justices-approach their task.
One final excerpt may be allowed as indicating a striking formulation -in the course of these decisions of the familiar mechanical view of
the judicial function. "There should be no misunderstanding," said
Justice Roberts in the A. A. A. opinion, "as to the function of this court
11

298 U. S. 587, 56 S. Ct. 918 (1936).
Id., 298 U.S. at 633.
13
Id., 298 U.S. at 636. This passage shows strikingly the similarity of Stone's
views to those of Holmes. Cf. the latter's dissent in Lochner v. New York, 198 U. S.
45 at 75, 25 S. Ct. 539 (1905), that "a Constitution is not intended to embody a
particular economic theory, whether of paternalism and the organic relation of the
citizen to the State or of laissez-faire. It is made for people of fundamentally differing
views, and the accident of our finding certain opinions natural and familiar or novel
and even shocking ought not to conclude our judgment upon the question whether
statutes embodying them conflict with the Constitution of the United States. • •• The
Fourteenth Amendment does not enact Mr. Herbert Spencer's Social Statics."
14
301 u. s. 1, 57 s. Ct. 615 (1937).
15
Id., 301 U.S. at 41.
16
Id., 301 U.S. at 77.
12
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in such a case. It is sometimes said that the court assumes a power to
overrule or control the action of the people's representatives. This is a
misconception." 11 He then continued his description of the process
whereby the constitutionality of a statute is tested, saying that
"the judicial branch of the Government has only one duty,-to
lay the article of the Constitution which is invoked beside the
statute which is challenged and to decide whether the latter squares
with the former.... Its delicate and difficult office is to ascertain
and declare whether the legislation is in accordance with, or in
contravention of, the provisions of the Constitution; and, having
done that, its duty ends." 18
Such an explanation, it has been frequently pointed out, begs the real
question. All would agree that when a statute conflicts with the Constitution, the former must yield. The vital issue is how the Court
decides whether such a conflict does in fact exist. The nature of this
process is the point at which divergent opinions arise. Is it merely, as
the pure mechanical theory must assume, the exposition and application of a document of self-evident meaning? This can hardly suffice
to explain legitimate differences of opinion among honest and able
men----among the judges themselves. Obviously, it is something more
than this and less than the exercise of untrammeled will.
Of course it is not for a moment to be contended that these differences in view are recent or novel developments. The insistence that
the judge is not influenced by will or opinions as to the wisdom of
legislation is to be found in Hamilton's papers in The Federalist, 111 in
Marshall's constitutional decisions, and in recurring judicial dissertations throughout the Court's history. Likewise the unchangeable nature
of the Constitution has been emphasized again and again, to receive
perhaps its classic formulation in Ex parte Milligan 20 and to be
stressed notably in later years in dissents in the N ebbia case 21 and the
Minnesota Mortgage Moratorium case.22 Certainly the tendency to
take a substantially different view, namely one which refuses to regard
the judge as an inhuman or superhuman automaton, is to be found
clearly expressed in many of Justice Holmes' best-known opinions.28
11

United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. lat 62, 56 S. Ct. 312 (1936).
Id., 297 U. S. at 62-63.
111 See especially Number 78.
20
4 Wall. (71 U.S.) 2 (1866).
21
Nebbia v. New York, 291 U. S. 502, 54 S. Ct. 505 (1934).
22
Home Building & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 54 S. Ct. 231
(1934).
28
FRANKFURTER, MR. JusTicE HoLMES AND THE SUPREME CouRT (1938).
18
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The controversy over the proper exercise of the judicial power of
interpretation is by no means a new one. Emphasis has been laid, for
illustrative purposes, on its more recent phase because it seems apparent that the fate of much experimental social legislation before the
Court has depended and continues to depend to a large degree upon
the attitude of the judges and their conception of the role they are to
play in interpreting and applying the Constitution. The events ot the
last few years, and the importance of the question of the judges' general approach to legislation, seem to make it desirable to examine anew
. some of the important factors involved in the judicial interpretation of
fundamental law.

I
THE MECHANICAL THEORY OF THE JUDICIAL FUNCTION

Much has been written about the so-called "mechanical theory" of
the -judicial function. Limitations of space and the general familiarity
of the subject-matter suggest that a brief summary of the theory and
some of the criticisms advanced against it will suffice for the purposes
of the present discussion. According to this view the judge has merely
the function of :finding and applying a rule of pre-existing and allsufficient law. 24 This concept of the role of the judge leads to the theory
of a closed system of rules mechanically developed by inflexible logic
and automatically administered~ The judicial function is thought of as
consisting only in the application of a rigid legal formula to a particular set of facts. The rule to be applied is definitely prescribed as such
in the existing body of the law, or it is logically deducible from
authoritatively given .premises. The application of law is held to
proceed entirely upon rule and logic, and to afford no occasion for
shaping or direction in the hands of the judge. Interpretation is thought
to consist of an absolute method allowing no scope for anything but
discovery of the actual, or logical deduction of the potential legal rule
and its application mechanically to the case at hand. The idea is given
scientific form by the theory of the separation of powers, according to
which the legislature makes the law, the executive administers it, and
the judiciary applies it to the decision of particular causes. It is admitted that the courts must interpret to apply, but this interpretation
is taken to be in no sense a lawmaking activity. The law is conceived
24 PouND, AN INTRODUCTION To THE PHILOSOPHY oF LAw 111-112 (1922).
See, for example, Elihu Root's description of the "true function" of the judge. Root,
"The Importance o,f an Independent Judiciary," 72 INDEPENDENT 704 (1912).
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of as already in existence. Judicial power is thus held to be legitimately
exercised only when the judge gives effect to the discoverable will of
the lawmaker.25 The function of the judge is thus considered to be
purely passive. He is the oracle of the law, but he does not make or
change the law. In the words of Montesquieu, "the judges are but the
mouth which pronounces the words of law; they are merely inanimate
beings." 26 Judicial opinions may be evidence of what the law is, but
they do not make law. Thus the judicial function is thought of as
beginning and ending with the application to a particular case of a
rigid and unchanging legal formula specifically prescribed as such or
exactly deducible from authoritative premises. It is affirmed that "The
man who claims that under our system the courts make law is asserting
that the courts habitually act unconstitutionally." 27
This conception of the judicial application of written law obviously
proceeds upon several assumptions. There is presumed to be a complete body of pre-existing law which is capable of offering solutions
for all subsequent controversies. One, and only one, correct application
of the law is possible, and this application is apparent and obvious to
all reasonable men. 28 The judge himself is assumed to function in a
purely impersonal manner, with the result being attributed wholly to
the will of the lawmaker and not at all to the individual capacities or
outlook of the judge. It is taken for granted that there is a will of the
lawmaker for every possible situation within the area covered by the
written provision and that this will is discoverable and must govern
all succeeding cases. Interpretation is conceived of as the finding and
application of that discoverable will, and nothing more. Where logical
analogy is resorted to in order to fill out gaps in the law, it is considered
to be a purely automatic process leading to the will of the lawmaker
where it is not express and involving no element of choice or direction
by the judge. Finally, no distinction is presumed to exist, for the purposes of interpretation, between detailed legislative rules and broad
legal standards embodied in the written law. All written provisions, in25 This makes of the court, according to Professor Pound, a "sort of judicial slot
machine." " ••• the facts do not always fit the machinery, and hence we may have to
thump and joggle the machinery a bit in order to get anything out. But even in
extreme cases of this departure from the purely automatic, the decision is attributed, not
at all to the thumping and joggling process, but solely to the machine." PouND, THE
SPIRIT OF THE CoMMON LAW 171 (1921).
26 DE L'EsPRIT DES Lois, Bk. XI, c. VI.
21
Zane, "German Legal Philosophy," 16 M1cH. L. REV. 287 at 338 (1918).
28
For an elaboration of this point, see Dodd, "The Judicial Function in Construing a Written Constitution," 4 ILL. L. Q. 219 (1922).
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eluding broad constitutional clauses, are considered subject to the same
process with the same result, namely, the discovery of the will of the
lawmaker.
Certain obstacles appear in accepting the strict view of interpretation as outlined under the mechanical theory. It is apparent upon very
little reflection that in many instances the will of the actual lawmaker
cannot be determined. "The lawmaker" himself is of course the merest
abstraction. 29 And when the lawmaker is in fact a large body of men,
one has very often to deal not with legislative will but legislative wills. 30
Moreover, most of the problems of interpretation arise in circumstances
about which the legislator had no intent at all. Where the lawmaker
had no real intent, and where gaps are to be filled in, it is impossible
for the judge to adhere in fact to the theory that it is his sole function
to effect the legislative will. In this sphere, according to C. K. Allen,
"there is a very wide margin in almost every statute where the Courts
cannot be said to be following any will except their own." 31
Even if the lawmaker were an actual entity, and even if he did
have an intent with regard to all subsequent cases arising under the
law, the words used in conveying that intent would be necessarily subject to different views as to meaning. It would be possible to accept the
proposition that there is a legislative will and to deny at the same time
that the courts ordinarily can and do find it. Words are inadequate
vehicles of meaning. They are, in themselves, merely symbols which
require complicated processes of thought before significance can be
attached to them. As symbols, they are imperfect and changing, and
altogether incapable of acting as the carriers of fixed and definite meaning.82 Many have pointed out that the legislature in enacting a law
merely puts a number of words on the statute books, that these words
have meaning only when interpreted and applied by the courts,83 and
29

See Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REv. 863 at 870 (1930).
Josef Kohler has emphasized that "whenever a law is adopted, all that is really
agreed upon is the words. For among those who have anything to do with the passage
of the act frequently something different is understood by each." Kohler, "Judicial
Interpretation of Enacted Law," in ScrnNCE OF LEGAL METHOD 187 at 196 (1917).
In the same volume, see Karl Wurzel, "Methods of Juridical Thinking," 286 at 356.
81
ALLEN, LAw IN THE MAKING, 2d ed., 286 at 301 (1930). "The fact is,"
according to John Chipman Gray, "that the difficulties of so-called interpretation arise
when the Legislature has had no meaning at all; •.• when what the judges have to do
is ••• to guess what it would have intended on a point not present to its mind, if the
point had been present." GRAY, THE NATURE AND SouRcEs oF THE LAw 165 (1909).
82
''Words," says Professor Wigmore, "are the most fluent and indefinite of
things." Editorial preface to THE ScrnNCE OF LEGAL METHOD xxxv (1917).
83 Says Dean Leon Green, "There is no such thing as words so plain that they are
89
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that it is for the courts alone to say what they mean. 34 This meaning may
often be very different from the original one attached to the words
by the person or persons by whom the provision was framed and
adopted. As pointed out by Gray
"A judge puts before himself the printed page of the statute
book; it is mirrored on the retina of his eye, and from this impression he has to reproduce the thought of the law-giving body.
The process is far from being merely mechanical; it is obvious
how the character of the judge and the cast of his mind must
affect the operation, and what a different shape the thought when
reproduced in the mind of the judge may have from that which
it bore in the mind of the lawgiver." 35
Due, however, to the general acceptance of the idea that legal rules
have an immutable meaning, much of the shaping of the law to meet
actual conditions must be carried on as a pretended interpretation of
the law. This is a real extension and creation of law, going beyond the
mere exposition of a written provision. "Anglo-American history,"
says Wigmore, "illustrates copiously how the judiciary have in fact
occupied themselves at all times with declarations of law independent
of statute, i.e., with genuine legislation." 38 The retention of the
pretext of effectuating a legislative intent is necessitated by the widespread belief that the function of the judge is merely to discover and
apply the meaning of the law existing prior to the decision. 37
Whether filling gaps in the written law, or deciding the scope of
application of vague and ambiguous words and phrases, the judge has
a more or less wide latitude in the choice of his starting point for legal
reasoning. It is not logic itself, then, that assumes the principal importance in this process, but rather the premises to which the logic is to be
applied. The accepted method of judicial decision often seems tacitly
not to be interpreted. There are no premises to be found so certain that nothing more
than an irrefutable logic is required. • .• The attempt has been made and still is made
to make language do the service of judging itself. There can be no such substitution.
Words are the machinery by which the power of thought is handled, but if there is no
such power put into them the words are lifeless." Green, "The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases," 28 CoL. L. REv. 1014 at 1018-1019 (1928).
84
ln a famous passage Gray declares, "statutes do not interpret themselves; their
meaning is declared by the courts, and it is with the meaning declared by the courts
and with no other meaning, that they are imposed upon the community as Law.'!
GRAY, THE NATURE AND SOURCES OF THE LAW 162 (1909).
85
88

Id., 163-164.

Preface, Sc1ENCE OF LEGAL METHOD :xxx (1917).
Pound, "Courts and Legislation," 7 AM, PoL, Sex. REv. 361 (1913), reprinted
in Sc1ENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 202 (1917).
87
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to assume the starting point, and then proceeds impressively to demonstrate that impeccable logic leads necessarily to a single result. In truth,
however, the very choice of starting point is often by far the most
important part of the entire process. For it appears that precedents
may be invoked and logic called upon to justify widely differing interpretations of the same text applied to the same set of circumstances.
This can hardly be explained on the theory that all but one of the
solutions is wholly wrong-that somehow individuals, including dissenting judges, who disagree have erred in their logical development
of the case. It is far more reasonable to hazard the guess that each has
a comparatively sound logical argument, and that divergent conclusions are reached largely because of divergent starting points.
When the written law itself, therefore, does not supply a definite
starting point, when what is meant to be a starting point must itself be
defined, there is what might be called an inevitability of choice. And, for
the most part, this choice must ultimately rest upon considerations derived more or less consciously from ideas and ideals outside the legal
order itself. The choice, once made, can be supported by precedent and
logic and the conclusion can be made to appear as inexorably dictated
by the written provision. But other choices can likewise be defended by
precedents and logic in many instances quite as impressively as the one
actually adopted. As a president of the American Bar Association once
said, "A judge may decide almost any question any way, and still be
supported by an array of cases." 88 The mechanical theory cannot countenance the assertion that the judge first decides how he will solve a
particular issue and then proceeds to find the means of establishing that
view in legal terms. And it may be that the judge in most instances
does start from legal generalities or principles that he considers basic
and deduces from them the particular application of the written law.
But it is perhaps quite often true that judges reason like other humans,
that is, that they in some manner reach a conclusion that seems desirable and then seek to justify that particular choice. 89
38
1 WIGMORE, EVIDENCE, 2d ed., xv (1923). Judge Baldwin quoted with approval the remark of an English judge that "nine-tenths of the cases which had ever
gone to judgment in the highest courts of England might have been decided the other
way without any violence to the principles of the common law." BALDWIN, THE
AMERICAN JUDICIARY 54 (1920), cited by CoHEN, LAw AND THE SocIAL ORDER 124,
note 32 (1933).
39 Referring to the "professed method" of interpretation, Max Radin remarks,
"That this is not always the true order of events is evident even to those courts which
announce their decisions somewhat in this form, or which imply a sequence of this sort.
They scarcely conceal from themselves or their readers that the order is in fact almost the
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Thus, although the judges may clothe the chosen alternative in
language of logic which makes it seem the only one possible, it remains
true that in a great number of cases there is an actual choice,4° and
that other conclusions could also be justified logically and legally.41
In a great many instances, therefore, the real question is not how far
a particular rule or principle goes in determining a given case, but
rather which one of several competing rules or principles shall be held
to apply. This choice cannot be based on the written text, but must be
indicated by resort to general legal or other concepts. "The major
premise of every judicial decision," says Rudolf Stammler, "is then
always a positive legal standard, which the judge m,,ust choose for the
case presented to him." 42 This choice has been hedged around and
restricted by canons of interpretation and construction and rules of
"legal discretion" in order to reduce to a minimum the appearance of
real choice. The fact is, however, whether it is distasteful or not, that
the judges must exercise choice,48 that such choice must often be influenced by factors outside the formal law, and that society must in the
long run be governed by the judgment of men themselves and not by
words of laws. "It has required a long process of painful experimenting," says Dean Leon Green, "to drive home the dreaded fact-if it
be even now driven home--that men must rely upon the judgment of
men and make the best of it." 44
reverse. • • ." Radin, "Statutory Interpretation," 43 HARV. L. REV. 863 at 864
(1930). See CARDOZO, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL ScIENCE 60-61 (1928).
40 Justice Holmes' phrasing of this idea is well-known. "The language of judicial
decision is mainly the language of logic. • ••• Behind the logical form lies a judgment
as to the relative worth and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an
inarticulate and unconscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve
of the whole proceeding." Essay on "The Path of the Law," in HoLMES, CoLLECTED
LEGAL PAPERS 167 at 181 (1921).
41 The judiciary "are constantly confronted with the necessity of making a choice
between the doctrines of the law which they are to hold applicable to the particular
case, and the choice which they make in the particular instance results inevitably in the
expansion or restriction of the doctrine applied or rejected." Macmillan, "Law and
Ethics," 49 ScoT. L. REV. 61 at 69 (1933), quoted by Shientag, "A Modern Judicial
Mind," 36 CoL. L. REv. 615 at 626 (1936).
42
"Legislation and Judicial Decision," 23 M1cH. L. REv. 362 at 370 (1925).
The italics are Stammler's own. See also LEw1s, INTERPRETING THE CoNSTITUTION
48, 49 (1937).
48
''We must spread 'the gospel, writes Professor Powell in a private letter from
which I quote with his permission, we must 'spread the gospel that there is no gospel
that will save us from the pain of choosing at every step.' " CARDOZO, THE GROWTH
OF THE LAw 64-65 (1924).
44
Green, "The Duty Problem in Negligence Cases," 28 CoL. L. REV. 1014 at
1020 (1928).
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In short, the mechanical theory demands the impossible of the
judge. Merely by ascending the bench he cannot shed the essential
characteristics of human thought processes.
"The judicial mind," remarks Lord Macmillan, "is subject to
the laws of psychology like any other mind. When the Judge assumes the ermine he does not divest himself of humanity. . ..
the impartiality which is the noble hallmark of our Bench does not
imply that the Judge's mind has become a mere machine to turn
out decrees•.•." 45
The man himself will continue to count, his judgments will continue
to be judgments expressing an intimate part of himself, and his conscious or unconscious choices will continue to be guided by what seems
to him desirable or necessary. In the famous words of Justice Holmes,
"The very considerations which judges most rarely mention, and
always with an apology, are the secret root from which the law draws
all the juices of life. I mean, of course, considerations of what is expedient for the community concerned." 46
If the judicial function has always contained a legislative element
and must always contain such an element, can it not be admitted that
a real, though somewhat limited, power of lawmaking forms the very
essence of the work of the judge? As Justice Cardozo has put it,
"So far as they are the mere mouthpiece of a legislature, speaking
thoughts and enforcing commands that have been unmistakably set
down, their activity is in its essence administrative and not judicial.
Where doubt enters in, there enters the judicial function." 47
The recognition of judicial lawmaking does not mean the recognition of uncontrolled personal volition on the part of the individual
judge. He is limited by the received legal tradition, by his desire .to
45 Macmillan, "Some Observations on the Art of Advocacy," 13 CAN. BAR REv.
22 at 23 (1935), quoted by Shientag, "A Modern Judicial Mind," 36 CoL. L. REv.
615 at 627 (1936).
46 HoLMEs, THE CoMMON LAW 35 (1881). It was in this connection that Justice
Holmes made his well-known observation that, "The felt necessities of the times, the
prevalent political and moral theories, intentions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had a good
deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should be
governed." Id.
47 CARDozo, THE PARADOXES OF LEGAL ScrnNcE IO (1928). The idea "that
courts only interpret and apply, that all making of law must come from the legislature,
that courts must 'take the law as they find it,' as if they could always find it readymade for every case,'' Professor Pound calls a "pious fiction." PoUND, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF LAW 107-108 (1922). See also PoUND, THE SPIRIT OF
THE CoMMoN LAw 172 (1921).
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meet with the approval of bench and bar, by the power of precedent,
and by his ideas of justice and the nature of the social and legal order.48
These latter ideas are not created by him, but are formed in him by the
principles prevailing in the community in which he has grown up. The
received tradition itself, however, is not a symmetrical and consistent
one. It allows for divergent opinions within its limits. Indeed, what
goes to make up this traditional element is largely what judges have
decided or do decide to be the general principles lying behind formal
law. The lawmaking function of the judge may be circumscribed by
this element, and yet be a truly creative process, adding to that tradition by its very exercise.
"We do not pick our rules of law full-blossomed from the trees,"
says Justice Cardozo. "Every judge consulting his own experience
must be conscious of times when a free exercise of will, directed
of set purpose to the furtherance of the common good, determined the form and tendency of a rule which at that moment took
its origin in one creative act." 49
Legal tradition does not exist wholly over and above the activity of
the judge as an external force imposing ascertainable limits upon him,
but rather is created by the activity of many judges, of whom he is
one, making choices within a more or less vaguely defined periphery. 50

II
CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION AND THE MECHANICAL
THEORY

The limitations of the mechanical theory of the judicial function
in the general process of interpretation have been indicated. They are,
as has been noted, largely traceable to incorrect assumptions. 51 These
assumptions, not warranted by the facts of statutory interpretation, are
48
Cohen, "Legal Theories and the Social Sciences," 25 lNTERNAT. J. ETHICS
469 at 475 (1915).
49
CARDozo, THE NATURE OF THE JumcIAL PROCESS 103-104 (1921). "We
must keep within those interstitial limits which precedent and custom and the long ana
silent and almost indefinable practice of other judges through the centuries of the common law have set to judge-made innovations. But within the limits thus set, within the
range over which choice moves, the final principle of selection for judges, as for legislators, is one of fitness to an end." Id., 103.
50
See CoHEN, LAw AND THE SocIAL ORDER 113, 116 (1933).
51
Professor Pound lists what he conceives to be the assumptions of the mechanical
theory, and concludes that they are "quite at variance with the facts." Pound, "The
Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 HARV. L. REv. 641, 802 at 824-825, 940 (1923).
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even more untrue when made specifically in connection with the interpretation of written constitutions. All the objections which have been
raised to the mechanical :view of the interpretation of statutes apply
a fortiori to the constructi<?n and application of constitutional provisions.
It is true of constitutions as of statutes that "it is with the meaning
declared by the courts, and with no other meaning, that they are imposed upon the community as Law." 52 Since a constitution is a much
more general document than a statute, the role of the court in shaping
the former by interpretation and application is correspondingly more
important. Vague words and general phrases abound in a constitution,
and must be given meaning by resort to considerations outside the
precise terms of the instrument itself. "In constitutional construction,"
says Walter F. Dodd, "we have probably the greatest degree of judicial
freedom in the interpretation of legal documents." 58 There are few
constitutional provisions whose violation can be determined merely
from a perusal of the texts involved. The meaning of the constitutional
text itself is by no means always clear. The search for that meaning can
but take color fr.om those who are empowered to decide :finally what it
is to be. 54 In going beyond the written text to :find some measure by
which to determine the meaning of the provision, the court often has
a conception of the ideal social order and the end of law before it as
an important factor in its conclusions. In this way the judges read their
ideas as to the nature of the social and legal order into the meaning of
vague words and phrases in necessarily indefinite constitutional provisions. 55 These ideal pictures of the social and legal order must be
reckoned with as a very considerable influence upon the judge in construing doubtful provisions, and no doubt form in many instances the
basis of decision for a particularly difficult legal question. 56
52 GRAY, THE NATURE AND SouRcEs OF THE LAW 162 (1909). Gray was fond
of quoting from a sermon of Bishop Hoadley, to the effect that ''Whoever hath an
absolute authority to interpret any written or spoken laws, it is he who is truly the
lawgiver to all intents and purposes, and not the person who first wrote or spoke them."
,
Id., 102, 120, 164.
53 Dodd, "The Judicial Function in Construing a Written Constitution," 4 ILL,
L. Q. 219 at 231-232 (1922).
54 Id. at 219-220. Freund has pointed out that the power of interpretation makes
the courts that exercise it "a rival organ with the legislature in the development of the
written law." Freund, "Interpretation of Statutes," 65 UNiv. PA, L. REv, 207 at 208
(1917).
55
See Haines, "General Observations on the Effects of Personal, Political, and
Economic Influences in the Decisions of Judges," 17 ILL, L. REv. 96 (1922).
56
Pound, "The Theory of Judicial Decision," 36 HARv. L. REv. 641 at 654,
802, 940 at 949.
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Some who admit the necessity of judicial lawmaking in the interpretation of statutes would deny its existence in the application of
written constitutions, and assume that constitutional construction involves very little more than a mechanical matching of phrases.57 When
the lower law conflicts with the higher law, the former must yield. The
higher law is presumed to establish definite limits beyond which ordinary legislation may not go. In order to determine the existence of a
conflict, one need only apply the stencil-pattern of the constitution to
the law in question. This conception overlooks the fact that in constitutions as well as, indeed even more than, in statutes the will of the
framers as revealed by the text may be partially or wholly unascertainable.
From the very earliest days of constitutional construction, the inadequacies of constitutions as providing a purely mechanical basis for
decision are apparent. Constitutions perhaps even more than statutes are
the very embodiment of compromise, and hence vague. In much constitutional construction, the search for original intent is forever impossible, due to disagreement among the framers themselves as to the
meaning of particular provisions. 58 Ambiguity and vagueness inhere
in the very nature of a constitution. It must speak in generalities and
leave the filling in of the gaps to the organs engaged in the actual
administration of its provisions. It is necessarily plastic and capable of
adaptation to the exigencies of the times, in so far as the judges can be
convinced of the wisdom of and necessity for such adaptation. They, as
ultimate arbiters, define the limits and contents of those general provisions more or less in accord with their views of social, economic and
legal policy. 59 From the beginning, the direction which the interpretation of the United States Constitution took was determined less by the
57
Curiously enough, Professor Pound seems to be one of these. He draws the distinction as follows: "In dealing with statutes, since from the nature of the case all
causes could not be foreseen, this finding the law or judicial lawmaking or spurious
interpretation is necessary unless we would have the courts decide by throwing dice or
casting lots. But in constitutional law, where the issue is simply whether the legislative
act must yield to the supreme law of the land embodied in a constitutional provision,
the question can only be one of genuine interpretation." Pound, "Courts and Legislation," SctENCE OF LEGAL METHOD 202 at 221 (1917), reprinted from 7 AM.
PoL. Sci. REv. 361 (1915).
58 See tenBroek, "Use by the United States Supreme Court of Extrinsic Aids in
Constitutional Construction," 27 CAL. L. REv. 399 (1939), for a discussion of the
"intent theory'' of constitutional interpretation.
59
See Theodore Roosevelt's message to Congress of December, 1908, quoted by
CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 171 (1921).
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instrument itself than by the economic, political and social struggle
between two opposing camps in early American party politics. ·
"· •. the success of Marshall," says Professor Wigmore, "in vesting
the federal judiciary with the revision of legislative statutes on
constitutional grounds, and thus preserving a legislative veto for
the judiciary, was an expression of the deeper struggle between
two political parties holding antagonistic convictions in the broader
field of general politics." 60
In the continued development of the Constitution, the role of the
Supreme Court has been to a great extent a truly legislative one, involving application of general phrases the meaning of which cannot be
found in the instrument itself. Constitutional law, as Dicey has said,
is to a very large degree judge-made law.61 The mechanical theory
cannot explain the divergence in the nature of the decisions rendered
by the Supreme Court on similar issues in the different periods of its
history. As one writer has put it, the different tenor of these decisions
is "explainable only by the political proclivities of the justices of each
period." 62 This need not be considered an indictment of the judges.
Lord Bryce pointed out that
"In none of these ••. periods can the judges be charged with
any prostitution of their functions to party purposes. Their action
fl.owed naturally from the habits of thought they had formed
before their accession to the bench, and from the sympathy they
could not but feel with the doctrines on whose behalf they had
contended." 63
The judge's shaping of the constitution will depend to a great
extent on his ideas of public policy and the needs of the community.
His interpretation of its vague words and phrases will take color from
60

WIGMORE, editorial preface to THE SCIENCE OF LEGAL METHOD xxvii ( l 917).
DICEY, THE LAW OF THE CoNSTITUTION, 8th ed., 467, note (1924). For a
brilliant discussion of the theme that "The law of constitutional due process is ••• as
much judge-made law as any common law is judge-made law," see Powell, "The
Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation," 37 HARV. L. REv. 545 at 546 (1924).
62
Costigan, "The Supreme Court of the United States," 16 YALE L. J. 259 at
266 ( 1907). "Marshall's own career," said Justice Cardozo, "is a conspicuous illustration of the fact that the ideal is beyond the reach of human faculties to attain. He gave
to the Constitution of the United States the impress of his own mind; and the form
of our constitutional law is what it is, because he moulded it while it was still plastic
and malleable in the fire of his own intense convictions." CARDOZO, NATURE OF THE
JUDICIAL PROCESS 169-170 (1921).
63
1 BRYCE, THE AMERICAN CoMMONWEALTH 274-275 (1888), 2d ed., 268
(1891).
61
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his entire personal conception as to the political and social ends it is
supposed to further. This will be done more or less consciously and
wisely according to the nature of the particular judge or judges into
whose hands the ultimate power of interpretation is given. But done it
will be, consciously or unconsciously, wisely or unwisely; and the
resulting interpretation of the instrument becomes its ultimate and
binding meaning, whether for good reasons or bad.0 ~
That the mechanical theory does not fit the facts is then apparent in
any realistic approach to the problem. Moreover, as Professor Pound
has pointed out, as a political theory of the nature of the judicial function it can no longer stand the critical scrutiny to which all legal and
political institutions are now subjected.65 There would seem to be few
reasons for not recognizing the actual place of the courts in the formation of public policy and the exercise of true lawmaking authority
under the broad powers designated by the term interpretation. So long
as we entrust to the courts the absolute and final authority to declare
the meaning of our laws and constitutions, so long as the courts must
necessarily exercise this function under the more or less direct influence
of the social, political and economic ideas and ideals of the justices,
and so long as the solutions of many problems of public policy must
stand or fall in accordance with their conformity to standards drawn
from outside the legal order itself, the demand that this process be
subject to critical analysis as genuinely creative activity is a compelling
one.

III
JUDICIAL SELF-RESTRAINT

Judicial self-restraint in the interpretation and application of the
Constitution, particularly with regard to the invalidating of legislation,
has been evidenced in the history of the Supreme Court in two different ways. The first has to do with the doctrine of "political" questions, or, as they are sometimes called, non-justiciable controversies,
in which cases the Court has refused to take jurisdiction. The other
concerns the application of the oft-repeated dictum that a law will not
6
' ''We have chosen," says Thomas Reed Powell, "to subject state and national
legislation to the judgment of the Justices of the Supreme Court with no further advice
than that they must exercise their judgment. • •• They are the arbiters. The judgments they give are their judgments; the reasons they give are their reasons." Powell,
"The Judiciality of Minimum-Wage Legislation," 37 HARV. L. REv. 545 at 572
(1924).
115
PotrnD, THE SPIRIT OF THE CoMMON LAw 171 (1921).
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be voided unless it is clearly and unmistakably contrary to an express
provision of the Constitution. While the former is not often included
under the caption of judicial self-restraint, the present discussion would
be incomplete without some attention to this phase of the subject.
The statement is often heard that the Constitution is law in the
same sense as any other kind of law, that all parts of the Constitution
are equally law, and that courts cannot avoid the duty of enforcing
every part of the Constitution as the supreme law of the land. In fact,
however, not all parts of the Constitution are equally enforceable. The
Supreme Court has on more than one occasion refused to enforce, or
even to consider cases involving the enforcement of, certain specific
constitutional provisions. This has taken the form of the doctrine that
the Court will consider what it deems "political" questions to be nonjusticiable, and will decline jurisdiction. Luther v. Borden 66 was the
first important case in which this position was taken explicitly with
regard to domestic affairs. This litigation, arising out of Dorr's Rebellion in Rhode Island, involved an attempt to secure judicial pronouncement as to the legitimate government of the state. Recourse was had to
the clauses of the Constitution guaranteeing to each state a republican
form of government and guaranteeing to protect them "against domestic violence." 67 The Supreme Court refused to take jurisdiction, characterizing the provisions in question as relating to non-justiciable interests. The opinion reveals that the Court was chiefly impressed by the
far-reaching consequences which might follow any attempt to settle
the question judicially. Beginning with this decision there developed
the idea that there are some cases of which the courts are not authorized to take jurisdiction, even though such refusal means judicial nonenforcement of express constitutional provisions.68 But the problem of
what are or are not "political" questions has never been adequately
worked out. It has been said that the term is applied to "all those mat66
7 How. (48 U.S.) I (1849). The doctrine was adumbrated in cases involving
the foreign relations of the United States. See Ware v. Hylton, 3 Dall. (3 U. S.) 199
at 260 (1796), in which the Court refers to "considerations of policy, considerations of
extreme magnitude, and certainly entirely incompetent to the examination and decision
of a court of justice." See also United States v. Palmer, 3 Wheat. (16 U. S.) 610 at
634 (1818); Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. (27 U.S.) 253 at 309 (1829); Doev. Braden,
16 How. (57 U. S.) 6351 at 657 (1853). Also Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270
at 288, 22 S. Ct. 484 (1902).
67
These clauses are found in Art. IV, § 4.
68
Field, "The Doctrine of Political Questions in the Federal Courts," 8 MINN.
L. REV. 485 (1924); also Weston, "Political Questions," 38 HARV. L. REv. 296
(1925).
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ters of which the court, at a given time, will be of the opinion that it
is impolitic or inexpedient to take jurisdiction." 69 Regard for possible
consequences, it is pointed out, seemed to be the determining factor
in the decisions holding that certain constitutional issues are nonjusticiable.70
Courts have never taken full advantage of the possibilities inherent
in this doctrine. Many of the laws relating to broad social and economic
programs struck down by the Court could have been approached from
this point of view. This would, of course, involve the surrender on the
part of the Court of a portion of its prerogative to pass upon the substance of an act as enunciated by the legislature. Measures conceived
to be of wide political and social import, the significance of which was
deemed greater to the nation than to the private litigants involved,
could by judicial self-limitation be held non-justiciable and hence not
subject to invalidation by the courts. That there are certain such controversies of which the courts will not entertain jurisdiction is not open
to question, although the extent of application of the standard is yet
to be worked out satisfactorily. A recent case in which the Supreme
Gourt refused jurisdiction of what it termed a "political" question contained a statement by Chief Justice Hughes that "appropriateness under
our system of government of attributing finality to the action of the
political departments," as well as "lack of satisfactory criteria for a
judicial determination," are "dominant considerations" in determining
whether a question is "political" and not "justiciable." 71 These same
69

Finkelstein, "Judicial Self-Limitation," 37 HARV. L. R&v. 338 at 344 (1923).
See Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U. S. l 18, 32 S. Ct. 224
(1912), Ohio ex rel. Davis v. Hildebrant, 241 U. S. 565 at 569, 36 S. Ct. 708
(1916), and Mountain Timber Co. v. Washington, 243 U. S. 219, 37 S. Ct. 26Q
(1917). Cf. Mississippi v. Johnson, 4 Wall. (71 U. S.) 475 (1866), and Georgia
v. Stanton, 6 Wall. (73 U.S.) 50 (1867). Decision of a "political question" by the
"political department'' to which the Constitution has committed it, said the Court in
Jones v. United States, 137 U. S. 202 at 212, II S. Ct. So (1890), "conclusively
binds the judges, as well as all other officers, citizens, and subjects of ..• government." In matters involving the foreign relations of the United States, the courts have
continued to refrain from interfering. Oetjen v. Central Leather Co., 246 U. S. 297,
38 S. Ct. 309 (1918); Commercial Trust Co. v. Miller, 262 U.S. 51, 43 S. Ct. 486
(1923). See Finkelstein, "Judicial Self-Limitation," 37 HARV. L. REy. 338 (1923).
71
See Coleman v. Miller, 307 U. S. 433 at 454-455, 59 S. Ct. 972 (1939).
This extremely interesting case involved an attempt to secure judicial pronouncement
upon whether a previous rejection of the Child Labor Amendment by the Kansas
legislature precluded subsequent ratification, and whether an unreasonable time had
elapsed since submission to the states. The Chief Justice ruled these questions "political,,
and held that the decision of Congress upon them would not be subject to judicial
review. Justice Black's separate concurring opinion is worthy of notice. See also
Chandler v. Wise, 307 U.S. 474, 59 S. Ct. 992 (1939), involving similar issues.
70
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considerations might counsel a refusal to take jurisdiction of cases involving the constitutionality of far-reaching social and industrial legislation. Such issues are not really to be determined in terms of legal
categories. The doctrine of "political questions" provides one way in
which the courts could withdraw from problems with which they are
not essentially fitted to deal. There is evidence, highly alarming to
some, that the newly reconstituted majority will adopt, though probably not through this means, the essential position that the legislature
rather than the judiciary is to be deemed better qualified to deal with
questions of significant social and economic policy. Such an attitude, if
generally followed, would be an exercise of judicial self-restraint in
the clearest sense of the term.
Far more commonly understood by the term judicial self-restraint,
however-and, from the context, what Justice Stone undoubtedly
meant-is, having taken jurisdiction, to resolve any doubt whatever
in favor of the challenged statute. In recent years this doctrine has so
often been paid meaningless lip-service in the very opinions striking
down legislation, that to many its enunciation has seemed an almost
automatic preliminary to the invalidation of a statute. It was not always
so. In the early years of constitutional construction, the Supreme Court
observed the principle quite closely, particularly with regard to cases
involving federal laws. The evolution of a broad judicial review over
legislation after the Civil War represented a drawing away from this
earlier practice, a fact emphasized in the strong dissents of Justices
Harlan and Holmes.
In the period up to the Civil War, particularly with regard to
federal statutes, the Supreme Court adhered generally to self-denying
standards. Although federal laws were challenged in some twenty-four
cases, only two were invalidated. 72 In the cases between Marbury v.
Madison,1 8 in 1803, and the Dred Scott case,74 in 1857, the two
glaring exceptions to the general rule, the Court not only refused to
declare a federal law unconstitutional, but in several instances went
quite far afield in search of an interpretation which would uphold the
statute. 75 A few examples merit special attention. In Loughborough v.
72
See HowARD J. SNYDER, TRANSITION TO JumcIAL REVIEW, Senior Honors
Thesis, Harvard College, 1939. Typewritten ms., Harvard College Library.
73
l Cranch (5 U.S.) 137 (1803).
74 Scott v. Sandford, 19 How. (60 U.S.) 393 (1857).
75 Some of the important cases in this period involving the validity of federal
legislation were: Stuart v. Laird, l Cranch (5 U. S.) 299 (1803); United States v.
Fisher, z Cranch (6 U. S.) 358 (1805); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, l Wheat. (14
U. S.) 304 (1816); McCulloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. (17 U. S.) 316 (1819);
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Blake,16 the Court actively sought out means of upholding a federal
direct tax on the District of Columbia, and found it not only in the
taxing power but also in the section giving authority to provide for
organizing, arming, and disciplining a militia. 77 In United States v.
Coombs,18 a federal law punishing thefts from wrecked ships was sustained although the admiralty power, under which it was presumably
enacted, was found inadequate to support it. Justice Story, writing the
opinion, remarked that a law must never be assumed unconstitutional
"unless that conclusion is forced upon the Court by language altogether
unambiguous." 10 After admitting that the admiralty power was insufficient as a basis for the act, he went on to uphold it as an exercise of
the commerce power. Again, in United States v. Marigold,8° the Court,
in order to uphold a federal act punishing counterfeiting, found it
necessary to seek out a di:fferent part of the Constitution to validate each
section of the statute.
In the period immediately following the Civil War, however, the
Court began to take a new attitude. Although the old doctrines were
repeated, in the years from the War to the 'eighties new concepts were
developing which formed the basis for the elaboration of the broad
judicial review which emerged after I 890. The Court no longer actively
sought for means of sustaining statutes. Although repeating the old
platitude that any rational doubt was to be resolved in favor of the
law, the Court more and more began to weigh constitutional questions
de nova and to uphold or reject legislation as the weight of the argument seemed to indicate. This was a departure from previous practice,
although it was accompanied by the reiteration of earlier doctrines. 81
No longer was the Court to uphold federal legislation if any reasonable
United States v. Smith, 5 Wheat. (18 U.S.) 153 (1820); Wayman v. Southard, IO
Wheat. (23 U. S.) l (1825); United States v. Gratiot, 14 Pet. (39 U. S.) 526
(1840); Cary v. Curtis, 3 How. (44 U.S.) 236 (1845); Jones v. Van Zandt, 5 How.
(46 U. S.) 215 (1847); Sheldon v. Sill, 8 How. (49 U. S.) 441 (1850); Genesee
Chief v. Fitzhugh, 12 How. (53 U. S.) 443 (1851); United States v. Ritchie, 17
How. (58 U. S.) 525 (1854); Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co.,
18 How. (59 U.S.) 421 (1856); and Murray's Lessee v. Hoboken Land & Improvement Co., 18 How. (59 U.S.) 272 (1856).
16
5 Wheat. (18 U. S.) 317 (1820).
77
Art. I, § 8, par. 16.
78
12 Pet. (37 U.S.) 72 (1838).
79 Id. at 75.
80
9 How. (50 U.S.) 560 (1850).
81
Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 603 (1870), a 4-3 decision, is in
many ways an important turning point in this development. The opinions in that case
will be found of special interest in this connection. See also Collector v. Day, 11 Wall.
(78 u. S.) II3 (1871).
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argument could be presented for it, but only if that argument, in the
opinion of the majority of the Court, was the better argument. Nor did
the Court, therefore, unduly exert itself to uphold legislation. In
United States v. Fox,82 there was involved a law which punished anyone "who, within three months before the commencement of proceedings in bankruptcy, under . . . pretense of carrying on business
and dealing in the ordinary course of trade, obtains on credit from any
person any goods or chattels with intentto defraud." Said Justice Field,
in condemning the law, "It is quite possible that the framers of the
statute i~tended it to apply only to acts committed in contemplation
of bankruptcy; -but it does not say so, and we cannot supply qualifications which the legislature has failed to express." 88
In addition, the Court began requiring that the means adopted to a
legitimate end must be "appropriate" in the eyes of the Court, thus
ironically turning Marshall's old dictum against national power. For
example, in Hepburn v. Griswold,84 the Court said the statute was not
"in any reasonable or satisfactory sense an appropriate or plainly
adapted means to the exercise of that power," i.e., the currency power. 85
While the issue of the notes was held proper, the provision making
them legal tender was not. Justice Miller, dissenting, pointed out the
advantages of having them legal tender, and quoted Marshall's statement that "Congress must possess the choice of means, and must
be empowered to use any means which are in fact conducive to the
exercise of the power granted by the Constitution." 86 Nor did the
Court in this period hesitate to use the "spirit of the Constitution" as
an ample basis for invalidating federal legislation. To refer again to
Hepburn v. Griswold, the Court made the following statement with
reference to the contract clause, which is, of course, a limitation only
upon the state governments.
"But we think it clear that those who framed and those who
adopted the Constitution, intended that the spirit of this prohibition should pervade the entire body of legislation.... In other
words, we cannot doubt that a law not made in pursuance of an
express power, which necessarily and in its direct operation im95 u. s. 670 (1878).
Id. at 672-673.
8
"' 8 Wall. (75 U. S.) 603 (1870).
85 Id. at 616.
8 6 Id. at 629, quoting United States v. Fisher, 2 Cranch (6 U. S.) 358 at 396
(1805). See also United States v. De Witt, 9 Wall. (9 U.S.) 41 (1870), and United
States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214 (1876).
82

88
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pairs the obligation of contract, is inconsistent with the spirit of
the Constitution." 87
The whole development was so gradual and its results so congenial to the general spirit of the times, that an exaggerated judicial
review had fastened itself firmly upon American institutions by the
turn of the century. Judicial distrust of legislatures and legislation outlived the economic and political validity of laissez-faire, and resulted
in a serious inability of the governmental machine to meet the exigencies of a highly complicated civilization. Just as economic considerations in the latter part of the last century counseled a free hand for
private investment and exploitation of the country's vast resources, so
today economic factors, following the breakdown of laissez-faire, require the existence of a well-equipped governmental mechanism competent to its task. The earlier needs led to the development of political
laissez-faire embodied in the judicially enforceable concept of "liberty''
in the due process clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
The later needs point to the desirability of judicial recognition of an
increased sphere for legislative and administrative action. Such recognition necessarily means a break with a number of carefully-developed
precedents of the preceding era. This is now taking place. The present
conflict of ideas, both on the Court and outside it, is a reflection of this
state of flux. The transition might be expected to entail a re-examination of postulates with regard to what the Constitution requires of the
judiciary.
There is evidence that such reappraisal of the nature and consequences of judicial interpretation of the Constitution is being undertaken, both by scholars and judges. Those jurists who have most
clearly recognized the character and implications of the process in
which they were engaged are the ones who have most eloquently urged
a judicial tolerance in dealing with legislation. Among these, the name
of Holmes is uppermost. He gave impressive formulation in many of
his famous opinions to the conviction that judges, consciously or unconsciously, were reading individual prejudices into the phrases of the
Constitution, and were in consequence depriving legislatures of their
rightful powers. Speaking of Holmes in a recent book, Professor Corwin says, "feeling himself not to be God Almighty, Justice Holmes
became the mouthpiece of a new gospel of laissez-faire, namely of
laissez-/airc for legislative power, because legislative power represents,
or under a democratic dispensation ought to represent, what he termed
81

Hepburn v. Griswold, 8 Wall. (75 U.S.) 603 at 623 (1870).

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[ Vol 39

'the dominant power of society.'" 88 It is at least possible that the
worldly, tolerant views inevitably associated with the name of Holmes,
and carried on by Card9zo, Brandeis, and Stone, are soon destined to
find their way into the dominant Supreme Court attitude. Writing as
early as 1934, one commentator felt justified in saying that
"The judges' growing realization of the nature of their role
and of the necessity of their being informed if their decisions are
to be wise, their growing skepticism as to the finality of their own
wisdom and even more as to the finality of the wisdom of their
predecessors, their tendency more and more to adopt a policy of
laissez-faire for legislatures and especially for Congress-these
are the most significant developments in constitutional law
today." 89
Certainly that observation, whatever the degree of accuracy it may
have had in 1934, is emphatically true today. Perhaps never in the
history of the Court has there been such a period as that since 1937 for
the modification or reversal of the results of predecessors' wisdom. And
these modifications have been, on the whole, steps in the direction of
"laissez-faire for legislatures."
Of the justices added to the tribunal since the "Supreme Court
Revolution of 1937," Justice Black has perhaps most clearly indicated
his position in connection with the general question of judicial review.
In his opinions on the Court he has given evidence of a realistic and
refreshing awareness of the peculiar province of legislative and administrative bodies and the need for judicial self-restraint in dealing with
their activities. 00 In an early dissenting opinion he described the inherent advantages of a legislature over a court in making decisions as
to matters of policy. He concluded by asking whether laws may be
held invalid "because the court is convinced that the legislature might
have chosen a wiser, less expensive and less burdensome regulation?"
If this be so, "the final determination of the wisdom and choice of legislative policy has passed from the legislatures-elected by and responsible to the people-to the courts." 91 In other opinions he has pointed
out the inherent limitations of the judicial procedure with respect to
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the review of legislative and administrative determinations, and has
sought a redefinition of the scope of judicial review with regard to
state as well as federal agencies. 92
There is every reason to believe that Justice Frankfurter also may
be expected to carry on the Holmes tradition regarding the relationship of legislative to judicial functions. In a book published shortly
before his accession to the bench, Justice Frankfurter wrote of Holmes
that ''He left issues in the arena where they belong. He knew that
judges in their way legislate, and therefore did not propose that they
should undermine the legislature's power to legislate." 98 Holmes
exhibited "the judicial function at its purest," according to Justice
Frankfurter, "whenever he upheld, as he so often did, legislation in
the substance of which he disbelieved." 9 '
If the views apparently fairly attributable to Justices Stone, Black
and Frankfurter may be taken as any indication of the tendency the
Court is destined to follow in its general approach to legislation, there
will have been accomplished a significant change in American constitutional practice.95 Given the institution of judicial review, and granted
the essentially valuative nature of the process of constitutional interpretation, the most important element in the judicial application of
constitutional principles is the underlying attitude in accordance with
which legislation is viewed. The broader theory back of many of Justice
Field's dissents represented essentially a restrictive and distrustful
attitude toward legislation in general. It came eventually to be accepted
in constitutional construction during the latter part of the last century.
So today, the attitude behind many of Justice Holmes' dissents, embodying a tolerance and self-restraint with regard to legislation and a
disposition to look less narrowly on the attempts of other branches of
the government to govern, may achieve a long-delayed ascendancy.
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